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Introduction and definition 
The term supermodernity (surmodernité) was coined by French Anthropologist Marc 
Augé in 1992 to define the period commonly known as late modernity. The usefulness 
of the concept of supermodernity, as compared to other definitions of the later part of 
modernity, rests on two things: the idea of exaggeration and the retention of the concept 
of modernity. Regarding the first point, Augé (2002: 26-45) talks of three excesses: 
factual overabundance (which is associated with an acceleration of historical time), 
spatial overabundance (the abolishing of distance by electronic media and 
transportation), and an excess of self-reflexive individuality. We can add a fourth excess: 
material overabundance. In relation to the idea of modernity that Augé keeps in his 
definition, it can be said that while some of the notions of modernity might seem to be 
outdated, as the defendants of postmodernity argue, its core categories are certainly not. 
I consider that postmodernity is, in fact, a period characterized by an awareness of the 
risks and flaws of being modern, but which has not been able to overcome modernity’s 
troubles. Our current concern with ecological and social catastrophe at a global scale is 
the demonstration that the process started during the 15th century is far from finished: 
we are probably just witnessing its climax.   
Key issues/Current debates 
The term “supermodernity”, then, captures well the essence of our present period of 
modern exaggeration. Another question is when to start such a period. Augé does not 
give clear indications, although it is implicitly understood that it covers the same 
timespan that others identify with post-, high, late or liquid modernity (Giddens 1991; 
Jameson 1991; Bauman 2000) and which begins around the end of the Second World 
War or later depending on the authors. This is the periodization that some researchers 
follow to define the archaeology of the contemporary as the study of the time that goes 
“after modernity” (Harrison and Schofield 2010). Although trying to parcel time may 
seem to be a fruitless historicist exercise, I think that it can also be a way of reflecting 
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on history and time differently. What we need is a periodization of modernity that fits 
the archaeological record. It is necessary to privilege in our periodizations not the 
phenomena identified by sociologists, culture historians or philosophers, but the 
processes of creation and destruction of matter that archaeology has traditionally 
employed to make sense of time and change. We have to follow the time(s) of things 
(Olivier 2008: 247-252).  
From this point of view, a moment that seems best suited to start supermodernity 
is the early twentieth century. It has been pointed out that the transition between the late 
nineteenth and the early twentieth century inaugurates a period in which globalization 
reaches its first apex and becomes truly global. Globalization is not just the circulation 
of people, images or ideas, it is also (perhaps primarily) the circulation of material 
objects. This was made possible by technologies of transport and communication that 
abolished distance in the service of an ever-expanding global capitalism (Harvey 1990). 
The materiality of the world became more and more integrated—more and more 
similar—and the mass-production of objects played an outstanding role in this process. 
More importantly, and perhaps not sufficiently appraised, the period that begins in 1914 
is marked by mass-destruction of human lives, societies, things and the environment at 
an unprecedented scale in the history of humankind. Interestingly, although the 
relationship between globalization, production and consumption has often been 
emphasized, the globalization of death has been less discussed. Thus, historians agree 
that the 1914-1945 period witnessed the collapse of the first globalization (Obstfeld and 
Taylor 2003: 125-126) as opposed to the late nineteenth century, but this is only the 
case if we pay attention to the movement of free citizens, capital and consumer goods. If 
we look at the circulation of soldiers, refugees, war machinery and destruction, 1914-
1945 is actually a period of astonishing global integration (FIGURE 1). High explosive 
has probably contributed as much to globalization as Coca-Cola, if not more.  
In fact, should supermodernity end tomorrow, it would be perfectly identifiable 
from an archaeological point of view thanks to global destructive processes. The things 
that demand the attention of intellectual gurus, social commentators, and their many 
followers seem somewhat banal compared to other issues that are leaving an indelible 
archaeological imprint in the world. In the long run, postmodern architecture would 
seem just like an anecdote (like the difference between baroque and rococo) and without 
new media the pace of global integration and social change would perhaps be a little bit 
slower, but it would happen nonetheless. It is on the destructive operations of 
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supermodernity that archaeology can provide a distinct and necessary critical 
perspective. After all, the transformations that archaeology documents more easily are 
changes in material organisations with high irreversibility (Lucas 2008), and these are 
also the ones that have further-reaching consequences historically: consider the collapse 
of the communist regimes, the Second World War or the end of peasant societies, all of 
which have left a wake of razed landscapes behind.  
If instead of looking at destruction, we focus on creation, the situation is not 
different. The supermodern landscapes of creation (Penrose 2007) are also landscapes of 
oblivion and devastation.  Urbicide is not only inflicted during wars (Coward 2008), it 
can also take the shape of urban renewal (Mullins 2006). In fact, destruction and 
construction should not be opposed; they are inextricably linked. This is obvious in 
slash-and-burn agriculture: the forest is felled, burnt down, and cultivated, but later the 
fields are fallowed and the trees revive with further strength. Similarly, the Neolithic 
houses of Anatolia and the Balkans were regularly destroyed only to be rebuilt again, 
energized by the seeds of the ancestors. The Neolithic probably marks the beginning of 
the strong interdependence between construction and destruction, death and the 
regeneration of life (Stevanovic 1997; Kuijt 2008). In this context, the destruction of 
houses would be “a matter of continuity rather than ending” (Hodder 2010: 150). It is 
not strange that this rationality emerged with the appearance of cultivation, which is 
also based on cycles of life and death.  
Yet with modernity, this logic is no longer sustainable: unlike in Neolithic and 
other nonmodern societies (e.g. Küchler 2002), destruction is no longer a form of 
continuity, regeneration and remembrance, but of rupture and forgetting. Destruction is 
neither a form of creating and maintaining relations, but of cutting them off: death has 
become an end in itself. In nonmodern societies, even war and predation are ways of 
extending relations (Harrison 1993, Fausto 1999). The change in the nature of 
destruction in supermodernity is no better exemplified than in the mass-production of 
nuclear weapons that can wipe out the entire humanity: death for death’s sake. Robert 
Oppenheimer’s words epitomize the sense of a new age of total destruction: “Now, I am 
become Death, the destroyer of worlds”. Oppenheimer’s famous misquotation is 
meaningful: the original cite from the Bhagavad-gita is “I am become Time, the 
destroyer of worlds”. But Time can no longer destroy things with its slow rhythm as it 
used to. Augé (2003: 110) says that “only a catastrophe can produce today comparable 
effects to the slow action of time”. Only Hiroshima or Katrina.  
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Spatial excess 
One of the points that makes Marc Augé’s definition appealing for archaeologists is his 
concern with places. According to Augé (2002) the time of supermodernity is marked 
by a shift from places to non-places: “If place can be defined as relational, historical and 
concerned with identity, a space that cannot be defined as a relational, historical or  
concerned with identity can be defined as a non-place” (Augé 2002: 83). Non-places do 
not foster symbolic relationships or a shared heritage. Their purpose is only to facilitate 
circulation and consumption in a global world (Augé 2003: 101). Non-places have all 
the appearance of a dejà-vu, which is not innocent: their mission is precisely to 
neutralize the sense of alienation in a foreign environment (Harrison and Schofield 2010: 
256). They eliminate the place-ness of places. Airports, highways, malls and hotels are 
typical non-places. Elsewhere, Augé (2003: 71) distinguishes between two categories: 
non-places of refuge and non-places of image (simulacra). The non-places of refuge are 
related to emigration and escape. We could include here detention centers for 
immigrants, customs posts and refugee camps. The non-places of image are best 
exemplified in theme parks and tourist resorts—all virtually identical from one corner 
of the globe to the other.   
The idea that the supermodern world is filled with simulacra is shared by other 
thinkers. It was another French scholar, Jean Baudrillard (1994), who employed the 
term simulacrum to define something which is not a copy of the real but that actually 
exceeds reality and creates its own truth. This hyperreality of the supermodern Augé 
finds it not just in new constructions, but also in the restoration of heritage, which 
creates a sort of historical hyperreality. What is interesting is what the anthropologist 
opposes to heritage sites: ruins. “The contemplation of ruins, writes Augé (2003: 7), 
allows us to catch a fleeting glimpse of the existence of a time that is not the one about 
which history books speak or the one that restoration works try to resuscitate. It is a 
pure time, to which no date can be assigned”.   
Although the existence of non-places has been questioned (Bender 2001: 78), it 
can still be argued that there are certainly spaces in supermodernity that if not totally 
devoid of identity, relationality or historicality, are at least hostile to the idea of memory 
and belonging. Archaeologists have started to study non-places in a way that is akin to 
De Certeau’s (1984) approach to everyday tactics of resistance. Against the idea of 
monolithic non-places, researchers reveal the practices through which non-places can be 
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appropriated and resisted. “The alienating qualities of these places are fragile: they can 
be challenged”, argue Hicks and Hicks (2006). Without negating the dismal aspects of 
non-places, in this case a retail center in Wales, Graves-Brown (2007) also points out 
ways in which the physical barriers that enclose the “concrete islands” that are malls are 
circumvented in practice. Harrison and Schofield (2010: 256-257) in turn, suggest that 
archaeology itself can become a critical practice: if non-places are presented as neutral 
and ahistorical, archaeology has to reveal “the specific histories of these places and the 
ways in which they are concealed from the public. The peeling carpet, the layers of 
paint, and the traces of previous styles of airport furniture all carry a sense of the 
specific history of the airport departure lounge, signalling to the passenger that he or she 
is in ‘this’ place rather than some other”. A similar approach is that of geographer Tim 
Edensor (2005), whose work has focused on other kind of non-places: abandoned 
industrial spaces. Although they are commonly perceived as a black hole in the urban 
fabric, Edensor shows that they are also arenas for creative engagements with 
materiality, where the regimented space of the supermodern city is actively subverted. 
The heterodox uses to which these ruins are put are a hint of another possible city and 
alternative urban experiences. While this is a valuable approach that can reveal an 
unexpected side to supermodern spatiality, we can wonder: do we not run the risk of 
overlooking the power structures that support the existence of non-places by trying to 
find small cracks in the system? How destabilizing to supermodern power actually are 
the paths open in the gardens of a shopping center, a peeling carpet or the teenagers 
smashing windows in a derelict factory?  
Non-places are just a variable of supermodern geographies. Other kinds of 
spaces exist. Bauman (2000: 98-104), following different authors, proposes a typology 
of mostly dystopic places, which he labels emic, phagic and empty (in addition to non-
places). Emic places create spatial separations (prisons, ghettos), whereas phagic spaces 
digest people and suspend otherness—consumer spaces fit in this category. Empty 
places are those that lack meaning, “leftover places”. I have suggested a category of 
place that tries to make sense of the politics involved in the spatial excesses of 
supermodernity: places of abjection. Like empty places, they are also a leftover and a 
memory gap. However, it is important to emphasize that places of abjection are 
characterized by an excess of wasted materiality: battlefields, scenarios of massacres, 
industrial disasters, shanty towns. When one walks around a war site of the last hundred 
years, one is struck by the enormity of material waste: concrete, cans and shells litter 
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vast expanses of empty, forgotten land (FIGURE 2). A similar impression can be 
obtained in slums, whose messy material overabundance stands in stark contrast to the 
sanitized, empty spaces of privatopias (Penrose 2007: 34-35). Unlike other spaces of 
supermodernity, places of abjection are only produced by political processes of 
marginalization and exclusion of (subaltern) people, (abject) matter and (dissonant) 
memories. 
Time excess 
“The time is out of joint”. Hamlet’s words resound along Derrida’s book, Specters of 
Marx (2006). “Time is disarticulated, dislocated, dislodged, time is run down, on the 
run and run down, deranged, both out of order and mad. Time is off its hinges, time is 
off course, beside itself, disadjusted” (Derrida 2006: 20). This is a more eloquent way of 
describing the state of time in supermodernity than the usual idea of accelerated time. 
Because it is not only that things go faster or that there is a factual excess, as Augé and 
others suggests. It is also, more precisely, that time is out of joint, which is also saying 
that time is both unjust and anachronic (ibid.: 25). Derrida, then, links temporality and 
morality, both of which are put into crisis by supermodernity.  
It is probably this feeling that has led archaeologists to focus on alternative, 
heterogeneous temporalities (Witmore 2007; Hamilakis 2011), which are also a matter 
of concern in other fields (De Landa 2000). Archaeologists working in the recent past 
have to be, more than any other practitioners, ready to appraise non-linear time to make 
sense of a world where time is deranged. They have to revalue other temporalities, those 
of subaltern and nonmodern communities, which still survive in the interstices of the 
supermodern world. They have to make visible these slower, bodily temporalities, as a 
way to challenge the disarticulated ephemerality of supermodern time. A good way of 
reclaiming other temporalities is showing its persistence in the present, the time of 
objects that anchor time, instead of disintegrating it: the time of immutable things, 
which has been forgotten. Think of a knife, an axe or a stone wall. They do not call the 
attention of students of material culture, which are fascinated by cell phones and i-pods. 
An archaeology of supermodernity does not only study what is new and changing, it 
should also vindicate the subaltern artefact that resists the annihilation of time: the 
humble, elementary object (Olivier 2008: 288). 
Because the time of supermodernity is not only disjointed and accelerated, it is 
also a time that continuously abolishes itself. For supermodern societies, there is no past 
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or future: only the instant (Bauman 2000: 125). There is an excess of present. From the 
point of view of material culture, the relationship of this temporality with planned 
obsolescence and fashion has already been noticed. Archaeology can, of course, study 
the ephemeral temporality of supermodern technologies, but it can do something else. 
Archaeology can show the collateral damages of instantaneity: living the instant, with a 
total disregard for sustainability in the long term, requires an intensified predation on 
the environment, which leaves a far-from-ephemeral trail of devastation (cf. González-
Ruibal and Hernando 2010). The ephemerality of material culture is certainly not new: 
it was already noticed at the beginning of the supermodern period, when skyscrapers in 
New York were torn down almost as fast as they were being built, over a hundred years 
ago (Yablon 2010: 244-246). The supermodern metropolis is hollowed out of a past; it 
inhabits an amnesic present. Connerton (2009: 88) talks about “the reign of a perpetual 
present”. Here lies another possible contribution of archaeology: by excavating the 
foundations of post-mnemonic cities, the discipline can simultaneously show that other 
worlds are possible and that there exists a past. Such an assertion, under the prevailing 
memory regime, can become a truly political one, especially if this past destabilizes the 
cleansed histories of progress or romanticized heritage pastiches (Hall and Bombardella 
2005).     
Material excess 
Material excess is one of the defining characteristics of supermodernity. However, 
sociologists and theorists have tended to downplay the relevance of matter and have 
preferred to focus instead on the less tangible aspects of supermodernity, either from a 
critical or celebratory point of view: networks (Castells 1996), fluidity (Bauman 2000), 
speed (Virilio 2002) and the virtual more generally. Capital flow, fast consumption, new 
media and intercontinental travel give the impression that we are leaving a 
dematerialized existence: Bauman (2000: 113-118) talks about the shift from a “heavy” 
to a “light modernity”. But is supermodernity truly that light? I would contend that, on 
the contrary, society has never been heavier and that to consider it light is the result of a 
process of purification, sensu Latour (1993), that blackboxes the material foundations of 
supermodernity. I do not intend to rule out the metaphor of liquid modernity altogether, 
which I think is apt and insightful. The problem is that the metaphor can lead us to 
forget both the true weight of our present time and that this weight is not equally 
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distributed. There are some regions of the world (those who suffer war or capitalist 
depredation), where supermodernity is heavier than in others.  
 The problem is that media gurus and journalists always tend to emphasize 
processes of virtualization. A good case in point is war, which is usually presented as a 
high-tech videogame. Yet the combat gear of supermodern soldiers is bulkier than ever: 
only their body armor can weight up to 15 kilos (Tyson 2009). And it does not matter 
how light a Predator drone is and that it is operated remotely, its effects are still strongly 
material and situated: rubble and splintered bones in a Pakistani or Yemeni village. 
Archaeology can be a counterbalance to the generalized perception of the world as 
plastic (Olsen 2003; González-Ruibal 2008: 252-254). An emphasis on fluidity and 
movement, in fact, may lead us to forget all the material strategies of fixation and 
circumscription deployed by supermodern powers: movement is always controlled. 
Those who move and the things that circulate have to be allowed to do so. It is a 
historical paradox that moments of high globalization come hand in hand with walls and 
fences: Hadrian’s wall, the Great Chinese Wall, the US-Mexico border fence and the 
Israeli West Bank barrier.  
Archaeologists have not been the only ones to have paid attention to materiality. 
Art has shown a fascination with material excess for the last three decades at least. 
Godfrey Reggio’s Koyaanisqatsi (1982) is a powerful audiovisual account of 
supermodernity, in which the mass production and mass destruction of materiality are 
repeatedly overlapped. A similar aesthetics are deployed by Andreas Gursky (2008) in 
his monumental photographs of cities, buildings, and crowded spaces, and Burtynsky’s 
(2009) equally vast depictions of supermodern landscapes altered to the extreme by 
heavy industry. These and similar works convey the impression of a deeply material 
world gone excessive, of superhuman scale and irreparable ecological damage and 
loss—things for which words alone cannot suffice: “a world beyond words” is the 
tagline of another visual experiment along this lines (Fricke 1992). However, it is 
important to bear in mind that the art of supermodern destruction is an art of the sublime, 
with the ethical problems that this entails.  
Burke (1834: 32) famously defined the sublime as “Whatever is fitted in any sort 
to excite the ideas of pain and danger, that is to say, whatever is in any sort terrible, or is 
conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a manner analogous to terror”. Terror, 
in turn, is associated to power: power is sublime because it can inflict pain and terror 
and only when power is deprived of this ability, “you spoil it of everything sublime and 
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it immediately becomes contemptible” (ibid.: 40). Yet the sublime is not only linked to 
terror and power, but also to pleasure and beauty: “When danger or pain press to nearly, 
they are incapable of giving any delight, and are simply terrible; but at certain distances, 
and with certain modifications, they may be, and they are, delightful” (ibid.: 33). This is 
what the art of supermodernity achieves: it creates a distance with terror and pain that 
renders the destruction of the world produced by supermodern power aesthetically 
pleasurable and in the last instance, safe and consumable. This can be noticed in Dan 
Dubowitz and architect Patrick Duerden’s exhibition: Fascismo Abbandonato. They 
have been documenting abandoned buildings of the fascist period in northern Italy, 
particularly youth camps. Theirs is an evocative vision of a failed modernist dream. As 
it happens with other similar undertakings, the exhibition is aesthetically powerful—but 
perhaps too much. There is an unabashed aestheticization of the subject. Thus, Duerden 
and Dubowitz describe the ruins as ‘huge and sublime’1—a description that would have 
pleased Mussolini. Herein lies the difference between the work of art and the work of 
archaeology. Although the sublime is not absent —and does not have to be—in the 
archaeology of supermodernity (see Andreassen et al. 2010) or the critical in the work 
of art (Blocker 2009), in the balance between terror and beauty, it is terror and power 
that should prevail; disgust, rather than pleasure. Consider two examples of 
supermodern excess: garbage and violence.  
In William Rathje’s research on garbage, there is little room left for beauty (of 
the conventional kind, at least): what we have are mountains of highly-polluting rubbish 
or daily garbage fresh from the bin (Rathje and Murphy 1992). Likewise, the 
exhumations of victims of political violence disclose piles of bodies, an excess of 
shattered human matter, which has become a fossil-guide for supermodernity (Montero 
2009) (FIGURE 4). However, archaeology does not only excel at revealing the abject: it 
also creates stories out of things—all things, no matter how humble or abject. With 
Gursky’s photographs, we are left in awe, but this is a sublime awe similar to that 
produced by the manicured space of a military cemetery (Augé 2003: 103). Instead, by 
carefully dissecting ruins, locating artefacts, studying the relation of small objects and 
structures, and exploring the sites’ afterlife, archaeologists can come up not just with a 
potent imagery, but also with detailed narratives. It is powerful stories that we obtain 
out of garbage from a landfill, a mass grave or the place of a disaster (Gould 2007). It is 
                                                 
1 http://www.fermynwoods.co.uk/archive/water-tower/dan-dubowitz-patrick-duerden/ 
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also this production of narratives that allows archaeology to construct a critical 
discourse on supermodernity, not just to stare at it in astonishment and powerlessness. 
Archaeology, thus, combines a concern for the manifestation of materiality, akin to art, 
and a commitment to analyzing reality, that relates it to other social sciences.  
Future directions 
Supermodernity has been defined here as a period within modernity characterized by 
excess. I have defended that archaeology can make a contribution to understanding 
supermodernity by looking into the excesses of time, space and, particularly, materiality. 
While the overabundance of the spatial and the factual has often come under scrutiny, 
material excess has repeatedly escaped the gaze of theorists and it has mostly fallen to 
artists the task of manifesting it. Archaeologists, however, are in a good position to join 
artists in the examination of supermodern materialities. The study of late modernity has 
been too focused on the ethereal realms of hyperreality and virtuality: the complex 
semiotics of simulacra and networks have captured all the attention of scholars and 
philosophers. As opposed to this, I would argue that the mission of archaeology is to 
address the Real, sensu Slavoj Žižek: the Real is what resists symbolization, “the 
traumatic point which is always missed but none the less always returns, although we 
try—through a set of different strategies—to neutralize it, to integrate it into the 
symbolic order” (Žižek 1989: 69).  Culture students abhor the Real precisely because it 
escapes hermeneutic efforts, but archaeologists are continuously facing the 
unconstituted, which is “not simply the unsaid, but the unsayable—it lies outside the 
said, outside discourse” (Buchli and Lucas 2001: 12). Referring to the Titanic, which 
has been transformed into a sublime object, Žižek (71) argues that “all the effort to 
articulate the metaphorical meaning of the Titanic is nothing but an attempt to 
domesticate the Thing by reducing it to its symbolic status, by providing it with a 
meaning”. What archaeologists have to do is to expose the excess of supermodernity 
beyond symbolization: the raw, traumatic Thing at the core of the Real. 
